In a recent issue of the Skeptical Inquirer, Editor Kendrick Frazier (July/August 2021) noted that UFOs, and the space aliens who putatively drive them, are actually being taken seriously by current mainstream media. This is happening in outlets we would normally expect to showcase scientific thinking rather than UFO promotion and publicity. Paranormal beliefs are beginning to intrude into the serious realm of the sciences, and the psychology of this intrusion may therefore be of considerable importance.
In previous research we published in this magazine, we studied the cognitive effects of psychological influences on paranormal thinking. These influences include dissociation, depression, and tendencies toward attention deficit. In normal people, in the absence of any sort of mental illness, we have found that these factors contribute to a wide variety of paranormal beliefs and perceptions, including Bigfoot and his cronies, the End of the World, and UFOs and their space alien pilots (e.g., Sharps 2012; Sharps 2014; Sharps et al. 2013; Sharps et al. 2014; Sharps et al. 2016; Sharps et al. 2019; Sharps et al. 2020).
But does this research relate to actual scientific thinking, more specifically to the gap between the real and the paranormal? In the present research, we have begun to address paranormal and scientific thinking in the same contexts, with reference to what we believe may be an overarching psychological factor in the less scientific realms: the presence of subclinical schizotypy.
Schizotypy is a poorly understood condition, perhaps especially in its subclinical form. As the term suggests, schizotypy lies on a continuum, presumably genetically mediated, with the truly terrible illness of schizophrenia; however, it is by no means the same thing (e.g., Sapolsky 1997). Those with tendencies toward schizotypy may tend to some level of cognitive disorganization, but they also experience introvertive anhedonia, leading them to a lack of pleasure in social interactions. They may therefore tend toward more solitary pursuits and occupations. There may also be a tendency toward impulsive nonconformity, perhaps suggesting limited self-control. These factors tend to show substantial overlap with the behavior of the general population, at least at subclinical levels. However, an additional schizotypal element also merits our attention here: a tendency toward the belief in unusual experiences.
Individuals with this tendency may imbue their own experiences with special, atypical, and potentially unique meaning. Where you see a tree, they may feel an idiosyncratic presence of the tree’s spirit. You see a squirrel begging for a peanut; they may see a spiritual if furry “fellow being” who is trying to communicate something, possibly of unique importance to rodent-kind and humankind alike. Everyday experiences, for those with schizotypal tendencies, may cross an ethereal line into an unusual, idiosyncratic universe of occult importance and hidden truth. This is presumably why these tendencies have been repeatedly linked with shamanistic behaviors in many cultures (e.g., McClenon 2012; Sapolsky 1997), although obviously we do not suggest cross-cultural diagnoses, and no value judgments are implied in modern research in the area.
Nevertheless, this linkage makes strong adaptive sense. To quote from one of our earlier SI articles:
All known human cultures possess beliefs in the paranormal. This may at first seem maladaptive—how could belief in the unreal be sufficiently advantageous that it would have survived the rigors of human evolution in the all-too-real world of past ages? Such beliefs may have yielded evolutionary advantages. Although the interaction of culture and human evolution is complex, it is certainly possible that shared paranormal beliefs within any given culture, such as shared veneration of ancestral spirits or god-kings, might have yielded a coalescent group loyalty that would be useful, militarily and politically, in dealings with other competing cultures. This might very well have resulted in a selective bias toward dissociative processes, leading to military or political success in those cultures which indulge in such beliefs. (Sharps et al. 2016, 40)
The ability to entertain paranormal beliefs may therefore have had adaptive significance in human populations. But how could these considerations apply to the realm of scientific versus paranormal reasoning?
There are beliefs in science that are unproven but that make statistical sense. For example, many professional scientists subscribe, and have for many years (e.g., Sagan 1980), to the concept that life probably exists in outer space. With the vast number of stars that exist in the vast numbers of galaxies in the universe—and with the same physical and chemical principles operating across that universe—the argument for probable extraterrestrial life is easily made on a statistical basis.
However, if your argument is that aliens from the planet Grak are attempting to steal your semen, it is unlikely that you can garner much scientific support for your hypothesis; there is really no question that you have undergone perceived unusual experiences.
So, we suggest that elements of schizotypy, even at the subclinical level in perfectly normal people, may be important in different ways for different levels of cognition—the thought processes involved in reasoning at different levels of scientific or unscientific rigor. The research reported here represents an initial attempt to address this hypothesis.
Experimental Framework
One hundred and thirty-four female respondents (mean age 19.16 years, SD = 2.84) and sixty-five male respondents (mean age 19.66 years, SD = 2.56) participated in this study. Respondents completed the Short Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason et al. 2005). This unique instrument addresses schizotypal tendencies, including such tendencies at the subclinical level, the focus of this research. The instrument consists of forty-three face-valid self-report questions divided into four indices directly related to schizotypal tendencies and beliefs. These scales measure cognitive disorganization (CD); introvertive anhedonia (IA); impulsive nonconformity (IN); and, most important for present purposes, unusual experiences (UE).
O-LIFE scores on the four subscales were compared, by means of linear regression analyses, with Likert (1–7) scales on the five items of what we termed the Space Belief Summary (SBS), where, for each item, 1 indicated total disbelief and 7 indicated total endorsement. The five SBS items were as follows. A brief explanation of each item is also included below.
Item 1. Life exists in outer space. As summarized above, given the statistical realities of the cosmos, this belief is considered highly or entirely defensible by many scientists.
Item 2. Civilizations exist in outer space. This statement requires a bit more belief; the development of civilizations, as we would recognize them, from the building blocks of life would presumably require some level of duplication or parallel development with the psychology and anthropology of Earth. However, this assertion, while less defensible than the first, is still perhaps defensible in terms of what we know of the vast number of stars and planets.
Item 3. The Earth has been visited by extraterrestrial beings. This assertion effectively requires what Kierkegaard called “the leap of enthusiasm” (Kierkegaard [1846] 1940). Cable TV documentaries notwithstanding, there is simply no accepted physical evidence of alien encounters. Enrico Fermi’s famous question, “Where is everybody?,” may find its answer in the howling uncertainties of the multiple unsolved variables of the Drake equation (e.g., Burchell 2006; Sagan 1980). The universe is very large, the physical distances immense, and the laws of physics enormously discouraging to those who long for travel at warp speed. An additional problem lies in temporal synchronicity: One must factor in the remote prospect that a space-faring civilization would have matured to its technological phase during Earth’s planetary lifetime, necessarily during the span of human existence to date, and even more necessarily when we as humans had evolved the cortical power, and developed the technology, to recognize the space aliens in the first place.
This problem is further compounded by the incalculable improbability of the Vulcans or the Klingons finding us way out here at all, far from galactic center on the spiral arm of an average galaxy. One doesn’t require a Dark Forest hypothesis, in which all the aliens are hiding from each other, to see the statistical improbabilities inherent in this one. In Eric Hoffer’s words in another context entirely (Hoffer [1951] 2010), one needs to be a True Believer to endorse Item 3; does one need subclinical schizotypal tendencies as well?
Item 4. I have seen UFOs. This one is self-evident. Either you think you’ve seen unidentified objects flying in the sky or you don’t, but if you do, you might be expected to consider the experience to be unusual.
Item 5. I have been abducted by extraterrestrials (aliens). Perhaps the ultimate in an unusual experience; to gain additional information, we asked respondents who answered positively to this question to provide us with accounts of the details.
So, in this experiment, we analyzed a continuum of space beliefs, from the rational and easily defended to the wholly idiosyncratic, against an established instrument (the O-LIFE) designed to assess schizotypal tendencies, including those found at the subclinical level (Mason et al. 2005).
Results
Interestingly, although the overall effect of O-LIFE scores was significant on SBS performance (R2 = .119, F [5,192] = 5.17, p < .001), three of the O-LIFE scales—introvertive anhedonia (IA), impulsive nonconformity (IN), and cognitive disorganization (CD)—had no effect on the results. Apparently one does not need to be cognitively disorganized to have strong beliefs about space and aliens, which may account for the many well-written accounts of the paranormal.
But, consistent with the hypotheses driving this work, the unusual experiences (UE) scale was another matter entirely. Regression analysis demonstrated that the influence of a personal belief in UE was significant on the SBS, p < .001. However, a personal belief in UE, consistent with subclinical schizotypal tendencies, had no influence on responses to Items 1 and 2, dealing with the reasonable statistical supposition that extraterrestrial life exists (Item 1) or even the somewhat more conjectural but still scientifically defensible concept of extraterrestrial civilizations (Item 2).
But regarding Item 3, the idea that space aliens have visited the Earth, the UE scale was highly significant, β = .220, p < .001. As suggested by the considerations discussed above, when a leap of faith was required, as it is in the idea of alien visitations, subclinical schizotypal tendencies were in fact important; however, the only factor that really mattered was the relatively uncritical acceptance of personal, idiosyncratic, unusual experiences.
As to personal UFO experiences or alien abduction (Items 4 and 5 of the SBS), we did not have enough respondents endorse either of these concepts for statistical analysis. But even here we learned something: only seven people claimed to have seen a UFO, and all at a very low rating of confidence.
This was a surprise. Unidentified objects are seen flying in the sky all the time, including odd clouds, satellites, misidentified aircraft and birds, etc. Yet only 3.5 percent of our respondents claimed to have seen a UFO, and all reported a Likert level of confidence of only 2 out of 7, suggesting that they weren’t at all clear on the experience. This implies something important—more for researchers in the area than for the research per se. This finding indicates that average people, when confronted with the concept of a UFO, may not be considering, generically, the correct idea of a UFO as something in the sky that simply can’t be identified. They may be thinking much more specifically and narrowly of starships, Klingons, Grays, and Mr. Spock, the usual subjects when the concept of UFOs comes up in media. This suggests that, in the construction of instruments concerning paranormal “observations” and experiences, researchers may need to be very careful about the language used.
As to UFO abduction (Item 5), only one person endorsed the idea, and at a confidence level of only 4 out of 7. No details were provided.
At least in this single case, we see that a memory of UFO abduction may very well not be very solid. This is perhaps more suggestive of an especially vivid nightmare than a real event. If this type of uncertainty were to prove more widespread than we could possibly infer from a single respondent, we might be better able to explain allegations of UFO abduction. This single case is suggestive, nothing more. Further study here is absolutely required.
However, the overall results of this study were entirely consistent with the original hypothesis: as space beliefs departed from high statistical probability to probability of a low order, at least one characteristic of subclinical schizotypy, represented by the unusual experiences scale of the O-LIFE, emerged as statistically significant. Perhaps theoretically interesting … but is this result of any practical value?
Additional Findings
Along with their responses to the O-LIFE and the SBS, our respondents provided Likert-scale data on the question of whether or not, if humans venture to Mars, they (the respondents) would personally volunteer to live there. The question was phrased in two ways, one of which stated that the Martian colonists would not be able to return to Earth and the other of which did not mention this fact.
These questions may be of considerable practical importance. Obviously, very few people will actually have the opportunity to colonize Mars in the foreseeable future, but there are huge numbers of willing volunteers.
Martian travel would certainly be an amazing experience. However, if one considers the probable realities of life on Mars in crowded spartan accommodations surrounded by airless rocky plains devoid of visible life, one might see the importance of understanding very clearly the motivations of those driven to desire a Martian lifestyle. Those entrusted with planning the sojourns of one-way colonists, pioneers who will live crowded in sealed quarters for life, might be very interested in the psychology involved.
Linear regression analysis was applied to these Martian questions against scores on both the O-LIFE scales and the SBS. Nothing on the O-LIFE was significant on the results, and four out of the five SBS items were not significant either, including the notorious Item 3 with its emphasis on alien visitors to Earth.
However, SBS scores were significant, both on the question of simply living on Mars, R2 = .078, F (5,191) = 3.21, p = .008, and of living on Mars with no possibility of return, R2 = .090, F (5, 191) = 3.80, p = .003.
Four out of the five SBS items were irrelevant. The only SBS factor responsible for this significant effect on Martian dreams was endorsement of SBS Item 1, the idea that “Life exists in outer space.” Responses to this item were significant on both Mars-colonist questions, whether or not they could return to Earth (β = .269, p = .009 and β= .277, p = .006, respectively).
This may be important in a very practical and potentially expensive context. Nothing of subclinical schizotypy was important here; all that mattered was the critical and quite reasonable idea that life exists in outer space. This concept was so important, to those who strongly endorsed it, that they were willing to live on Mars, even with no hope of return; no statistically significant difference was observed in responses to the prospect of terrestrial return or its absence.
People who believe in “life in space” want to go to Mars.
But there is no life, at least nothing we currently know about, on Mars.
It may very well be that people who want to meet the Vulcans, the Klingons, or other kindred space aliens want to go to Mars. If they make it through the relevant training, they may be transported to a cramped, crowded interior environment, from which they can only venture in space suits—an environment characterized by nothing more lively than static window views of relatively red geology.
For the rest of their lives.
This factor could prove seminally important for personnel issues, in the relatively near future, in the crowded confines of a Mars scientific station wherein an alien-loving true believer is suddenly confronted with the hard realization that the native population of Mars is pretty much a bunch of rocks.
Discussion
In this research, we found that specific schizotypal characteristics, at the subclinical level, had a profound influence on “space” beliefs. Not schizotypal characteristics in general but the characteristics reflected in the unusual experiences subscale alone. A global view of schizotypy at the subclinical level, without the precision of the O-LIFE, would have missed this effect entirely.
Also, this effect did not apply to the scientifically defensible beliefs that life and perhaps civilization exist elsewhere in the universe but only to the “leap of faith” belief that the aliens have come to Earth. This effect was not observed in the reasoning of science; rather, it was only observed in the netherworld of the statistically improbable.
We also saw that the language in which UFOs are discussed may be important for the interpretation of response, and that, admittedly in a single case, the concept of UFO abduction may be very uncertain to the alleged abductee. These very preliminary findings may be of importance for further research but are obviously not conclusive.
However, in a result of potential importance for the future exploration of Mars, we showed that a belief in extraterrestrial life may be very important in the desire to go to Mars, where, as far as we know, there is no life. This is a matter that may have real-world consequences of a very high order. It illustrates the importance of psychological considerations in issues of space and space exploration, as well as in our understanding of cognition in both the scientific and unscientific realms.
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